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Medicaid Funding for Transsexual Surgery
Jane Doe,' a genetically male transsexual, 2 was one of a number
of carefully screened candidates selected by the University of Minne-
sota Hospitals as eligible for sex conversion surgery.3 Doe, a recipient
of hormone therapy since 1968, lived as, and developed the physical
attributes of, a female. Certified by the Minnesota Medical Assis-
tance Program4 as totally disabled, 5 she' applied to the Hennepin
County Welfare Department for funding for the surgical procedure
1. The name was a pseudonym.
2. Transsexuals are individuals with the anatomy of one sex who believe so
firmly that they belong to the other sex and so totally identify themselves as that other
sex, that they are obsessed with the compulsion to alter their appearance, social status,
and bodies to conform to that other gender. See R. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER (1968);
Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Male Transsexualism, in TRANSSXUALiSM AND SEX
REAsSIGNMENT 48 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969); Dom.AND's ILLusTRATED MEICAL
DICTIONARv 1632 (25th ed. 1974). See also notes 33 & 76 infra.
3. Sex conversion surgery for a genetically male transsexual involves castration,
amputation of the penis, and sometimes construction of a functional vagina. Randell,
Preoperative and Postoperative Status of Male and Female Transsexuals, in
TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT, supra note 2, at 370-72; R. STOLLER, supra
note 2, at 247.
The sex change procedure is composed of three stages. First, as an attempt to
determine if the patient can adjust to a new sexual role, the patient is required to cross-
dress and function in society totally as a member of the opposite sex. During this
phase, which lasts about one year, the patient receives female hormone injections.
Only if the first stage has been successful will surgery-the second stage-be per-
formed. In the final stage, the newly transformed individual receives assistance in
adjusting to her new sexual status. Comment, Transsexuals in Search of LegalAccept-
ance: The Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 331, 337 (1978).
4. The Medical Assistance Program is the Minnesota State Medicaid plan cre-
ated by MINN. STAT. § 256B (1978). See notes 26-29 infra and accompanying text.
5. Doe was an eligible recipient of funds under title XIV of the Social Security
Act providing aid for the disabled. The disability was based on psychological factors
due to the transsexual condition. Doe v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W. 2d at
817-18; Brief for Appellant at A-2, Doe v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W. 2d
816 (Minn. 1977). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1976). See also note 20 infra and
accompanying text. To be certified as disabled, one must be unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment. This impairment must last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months, and be of such severity that the person cannot engage in any kind of substan-
tial gainful work, regardless of whether a job vacancy exists or whether he would be
hired for work if he applied. See 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3) (1976).
6. Transsexuals often refer to themselves, and are referred to by friends, asso-
ciates, and medical personnel, by pronouns appropriate to their gender of identity
rather than that of birth. See, e.g., Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(plaintiff use of female pseudonym); Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 14, 16-17, G.B.
v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
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necessary to overcome the final obstacle to her complete sexual trans-
formation-the removal of her male sexual organs and the construc-
tion of their female counterparts. After she was initially denied fund-
ing, Doe presented evidence at a hearing demonstrating her need for
the surgical procedure. 7 From uncontradicted evidence," a hearing
officer determined that the operation was "medically necessary" and
ordered that it be funded.' This determination was overruled by the
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare for two stated reasons:
first, the agency's Physicians' Handbook0 provided that transsexual
surgery was not covered by the Medical Assistance Program; and
second, Doe had failed to prove conclusively that the procedure would
remove her disability and make her self-supporting." This final ad-
ministrative decision was affirmed in district court 2 on the second
7. The hearing was conducted on appeal from the county agency's original denial
of funding. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-1. (See Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 16,
§ 10 1967 Minn. Laws 2072 (repealed 1976).)
Doe had undergone five days of intensive testing by the gender committee at the
University Hospitals, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota. This commit-
tee, composed of specialists in a variety of fields, evaluates potential candidates based
on all relevant physical, mental, social, and economic factors before concluding that
surgery should be undertaken as treatment for transsexualism. Only a select few - in
the current year one-tenth - meet the criteria and are recommended for the sex
conversion procedure. Doe presented the favorable result of the gender committee's
exhaustive inquiry as evidence that her surgery was medically necessary. Furthermore,
she testified that surgery was required to correct physical and medical problems caused
by her hormonal treatments, and that she hoped surgery would eliminate her need to
depend on welfare for support. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-2, A-3; Telephone
Interview with Dr. Lloyd Sines, Department of Psychiatry, University Hospitals, Uni-
versity of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 18, 1978). See note 40 infra.
8. The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) presented no medical reports, ex-
aminations, or opinions as to the necessity of the requested procedure, but only the
bare fact that a DPW publication, see note 10 infra and accompanying text, listed
transsexual surgery as a noncovered service. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-2,
A-3.
9. Local Evidentiary Hearing, No. 158, Case No. SM4 11190, Appeal of Jane Doe
(Hennepin County, Aug. 6, 1975), reprinted in Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-
1.
10. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
PHYSicANs' HANDBOOK § 205(10) [hereinafter cited as PHYSIcrANs' HANDBOOK].
11. 257 N.W. 2d 816, 818; Order of the Commissioner of the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Public Welfare (Jan. 21, 1976), reprinted in Brief for Appellant, supra note 5,
at A-8. The state agency had authority under Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 16, § 10, 1967
Minn. Laws 2072 (repealed 1976) to review and reverse the hearing officer's determina-
tion on its own motion without further investigation, but its decision had to be consis-
tent with the provisions of the Medical Assistance program.
12. 257 N.W.2d at 818. The district court was empowered under Act of June 1,
1967, ch. 16, § 11, 1967 Minn. Laws 2073 (repealed 1976) to review the state agency's
reversal either on the record or de novo only to determine whether the order of the state
agency was based on an erroneous theory of law or was arbitrary, capricious, or unrea-
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ground advanced by the state agency for denial of funding. On ap-
peal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and ordered that the
surgery be funded, holding that (1) total exclusion of transsexual
surgery from Medical Assistance coverage is void under federal regu-
lations governing state Medicaid programs; (2) a standard of medical
necessity that requires conclusive proof that a procedure will elimi-
nate disability and render the applicant self-supporting is impermis-
sible; and (3) the decision to deny Medical Assistance funding in the
absence of evidence to contradict the applicant's showing of medical
necessity is arbitrary and unreasonable. Doe v. Minnesota Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, 257 N.W. 2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
Medicaid, title XIX of the Social Security Act, was enacted by
Congress in 196513 to enable "each State, as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medical assistance...
[to those] whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical services."' 4 Participation by the states in
the Medicaid program is voluntary, but every state save one 15 has
enacted a state plan to provide the medical assistance funding .au-
thorized under title XIX.
An embodiment of the concept of "cooperative federalism,"' 6
Medicaid allows states considerable freedom to devise and adminis-
ter their own programs in accordance with their particular needs and
abilities. 7 To be eligible for federal financial participation, however,
a state plan must comport with title XIX and its accompanying
regulations.8 Although participating states may give medical assis-
tance to all needy persons, 19 they must at a minimum offer it to the
sonable. Id. The district court in this case did not take new evidence, but instead
upheld the state's decision as based on substantial evidence, not founded on an erro-
neous theory of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
13. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codi-
fied in amended form as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
15. Arizona does not have a Medicaid Plan. See [1977] 2 MEDIcARE & MFojcAm
GUIDE (CCH) 15,500.
16. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); Virginia Hospital Ass'n v. Kenley,
427 F. Supp. 781, 782 (E.D. Va. 1977).
17. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 616-19 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432
U.S. 438 (1977); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.N.H. 1976). See generally
Note, Medicaid Assistance for Elective Abortions: The Statutory and Constitutional
Issues, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 751 (1976); Casenote, Availability of Medicaid Funds for
Elective Abortions, 22 WAYNE L. Ray. 857 (1976).
18. The title XIX provisions that establish requirements for participating state
plans are found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(1)-(40) (1976). The relevant federal regulations
governing Medicaid, promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976), are found at 42 C.F.R.
Parts 430-460 (1978) (prior version at 42 C.F.R. Part 449 (1977)).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
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"categorically needy"-those who receive cash payments under spec-
ified categories of social welfare funding.20 To persons so character-
ized, they must provide medical care of five broad denominations:
inpatient hospital services; outpatient hospital services; laboratory
and X-ray services; nursing facility, family planning, and health
screening services; and physicians' services. 2' States are required to
set standards determining the extent of medical assistance they will
provide under their programs.22 Not only must these standards be
reasonable, but they must also comport with the general objectives
of Medicaid." No state may deny covered services arbitrarily, nor
reduce their amount, duration, or scope, solely because of an appli-
cant's "diagnosis, type of illness or condition." 4 The only basis on
which a state may limit covered services is on criteria such as the
need to safeguard against waste of program funds or lack of medical
necessity.2
20. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). The "categorically needy" include persons receiving
cash payments under: old age assistance or medical assistance for the aged, title I, id.
99 301-306; aid for the blind, title X, id. §§ 1201-1206; aid for the disabled, title XIV,
id. §§ 1351-1355; supplemental income for the aged, blind, and disabled, title XVI,
id. §§ 1381-1383c; or aid to families with dependent children, title IV, Part A, id. §§
601-610. Any state participating in the Medicaid program must provide medical bene-
fits to these categories of recipients. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). States may also choose to
give assistance to other needy persons. If, however, a state opts to provide funds for
any recipient class other than those defined as categorically needy, it must also include
all individuals who would, except for income and resources, be eligible to receive cash
payments under the above-enumerated assistance programs and whose income and
resources are nonetheless insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.
Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). This latter group is called the "medically needy." Doe was a
recipient of aid for the disabled and therefore among the categorically needy for pur-
poses of medicaid eligibility. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1976). These five areas of mandatory minimum
coverage are subsumed in the definition of "medical assistance" for purposes of Medi-
caid. Id. § 1396d(a). The statutory definition of medical assistance also includes: home
health care services; private duty nursing services; clinic services; dental services;
physical therapy and related services; prescribed drugs, dentures, prosthetic devices,
and eyeglasses; other diagnostic, screening, preventative and rehabilitative services;
services for persons aged 65 or older in an institution for tuberculosis or mental di-
seases; intermediate care facility services; inpatient psychiatric hospital services for
persons under age 21; and any other type of medical or remedial care furnished by
licensed practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by state law. Id. §
1396d(a)(6)-(17). For the "medically needy," states may provide the same five mini-
mum categories of service it offers to the categorically needy, or any combination of
at least seven of the sixteen listed categories of care. Id. § 1396a(a)(13)(C)(ii).
22. Id. § 1396a(a)(17).
23. Id.; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). See text accompanying note 14
supra.
24. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c)(1) (1978).
25. Id. § 440.230(c)(2) (utilization control). Medical necessity is discussed in
notes 41 & 57 infra.
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The State of Minnesota participates in Medicaid through its
Medical Assistance Program. 6 The Minnesota enabling legislation
explicitly states that the program must comply with title XIX provi-
sions." The Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, which admin-
isters the Medical Assistance Program, issues regulations 2S and guide-
lineS29 governing individual determinations of eligibility and medical
necessity under the state plan. At the time Doe requested funding for
her conversion surgery, the Physicians' Handbook of the Department
of Public Welfare Medical Assistance Program contained an absolute
prohibition against payment for transsexual surgery by Medical
Assistance.2 The state agency relied in part on this outright prohi-
bition, 3' the only one of its kind for a therapeutic surgical procedure,3 2
to deny Ms. Doe's application for funding.
Ms. Doe challenged the decision to deny funding for her sex
conversion surgery. In order to assess the merit of her appeal, the
court first reviewed the medical literature on transsexualism, con-
cluding that the only known successful treatment for this condition
26. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 16, §§ 1-27, 1967 Minn. Laws 2067 (codified in MINN.
STAT. § 256B (1978)). The Medical Assistance program undertakes to provide
"necessary medical care of a quality and adequacy consistent with good professional
practice as would reasonably be expected for others in the community." MINNESOTA
DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL, § VII-E (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MA PROGRAM MANUAL]. The program covers both the categori-
cally and the medically needy. MINN. STAT. § 256B.06 (1978).
27. MINN. STAT. § 256B.22 (1978). See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
28. See 12 Minn. Code of Agency Rules § § 2.047, .049.
29. See MA PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 26.
30. PHYsIcINs' HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at § 205(10).
31. The Physicians' Handbook was intended to be only advisory, but since the
agency had relied on the Physicians' Handbook to justify its denial of Doe's funding,
the court on review regarded the handbook as having an effect equivalent to a "formal"
rule of law. See 257 N.W.2d at 819.
32. The Physicians' Handbook absolutely excluded the following from funding:
1. Medications dispensed by the physician when the necessary medications
can reasonably be dispensed by a pharmacy ...
2. Medical services or supplies purchased by the recipient himself.
3. The cost of an autopsy.
4. Failed appointments.
5. Telephone calls or other communications between the provider and re-
cipient.
6. Routine reports (social security, insurance, etc.).
7. Investigational surgery or procedures (i.e. research efforts that are not
essential to the patient's health).
8. Illegal operations.
9. Artificial insemination.
10. Transsexual surgery.
PHvSICIANS' HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at § 205(10).
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is sex conversion surgery.3 Accordingly, the court held that the state
agency's absolute exclusion violated the federal Medicaid regulation
prohibiting a state from arbitrarily denying eligible recipients medi-
cal care and services solely because of the "diagnosis, type of illness
or condition."'" The court also found no merit in the agency's second
contention, that Doe should be required to prove that the operation
would allow her to become self-supporting.35 Since the hearing offi-
cer's determination of medical necessity stood unimpeached, 6 the
court ordered the state agency to grant Doe medical assistance fund-
ing for her surgery.3'
The court's rationale for striking the absolute funding exclusion
was clearly sound, but there is additional support for the court's
result. As well as prohibiting states from denying medical services on
33. 257 N.W.2d at 818-19. This conclusion is clearly supported by the medical
authorities. See, e.g., H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 91 (1966) (Psy-
chotherapy "is a useless undertaking with present available methods. The mind of the
transsexual cannot be changed in its false gender orientation. All attempts to this
effect have failed."); Pauly, supra note 2, at 37. (Transsexuals have "irreversibly
accepted a gender identification opposite to that of [their] normal biological ident-
ity."). See generally Knorr, Wolf & Meyer, Psychiatric Evaluation of Male Transsex-
uals for Surgery in TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT, supra note 2, at 279;
Benjamin, Should Surgery Be Performed on Transsexuals, 25 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY
74, 78-80 (1971); Hastings, The Surgical Route, 9 INT'L J. PSYCH. 273, 274 (1970-71).
Without treatment, transsexuals typically suffer chronic and sometimes severe
anxiety. Knorr, Wolf & Meyer, supra, at 278; Randell, supra note 3, at 363-67; Pauly,
supra note 2, at 44. Their inability to change their permanent and deep-seated gender
identity to conform with their anatomical sex frequently leads to attempts at self-
castration and even suicide. See R. STOLLER, THE TRANSSEXUAL EXpmuEWT 147 (1975);
Benjamin, supra, at 91; Pauly, supra note 2, at 37. In one study of transsexuals, 67%
suffered periods of depression, 60% had suicidal inclinations, and 17 to 20% attempted
suicide. Eighteen percent had tried to remove their own genitals, and half accom-
plished that goal with varying success. Id. at 43-44. See Knorr, Wolf & Meyer, supra,
at 278; Randell, supra note 3, at 365-68.
34. 257 N.W.2d at 820; see 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c)(1) (1978).
35. 257 N.W.2d at 821; see notes 62-68 infra and accompanying text.
36. The hearing officer concluded, based on the evidence Doe had presented, that
sex conversion surgery was a medical necessity for Doe. The state agency reversed the
hearing officer solely on the basis of the two conclusions of law that the supreme court
struck down as violative of title XIX. 257 N.W.2d at 821; Brief for Appellant, supra
note 5, at A-5. It was stipulated that the findings of the hearing officer were the basis
of the state agency's decision. The court, lacking a transcript of the proceedings, rested
its decision on those findings. 257 N.W.2d at 821.
37. Id. Chief Justice Sheran concurred specially in the result reached by the
majority only because there had been the unchallenged finding that the operation
involved was medically necessary. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Peterson, main-
tained that "[t]he extent to which the use of public funds for transsexual surgery can
be limited by the State of Minnesota and the character of the evidence required to
establish medical necessity are matters not before us in this case." Id. at 821-22.
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the basis of the type of condition, title XIX requires that any attempt
by a state to limit the extent of medical assistance be reasonable and
consistent with title XIX objectives.u An absolute exclusion from
coverage without consideration of whether a surgical procedure is
necessary to the health of the individual fails that test." What may
be a frivolous treatment for one individual may well be essential for
another.4 ' A refusal by a state to fund treatment that is medically
necessary is surely not consistent with title XIX's objective of fur-
nishing medical assistance to those who cannot afford necessary med-
ical treatment."
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
39. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (While it is not unreasonable for a
state to refuse to cover unnecessary procedures, "serious statutory questions might be
presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its
coverage.") Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976) ("There is no mandatory
requirement on the states that Medicaid benefits be limited to only 'necessary medical
services.'" Additionally, the court stated that "[i]f the states themselves impose such
a requirement, they may not. . . categorically decide without reasonable justification
that a specific treatment is 'unnecessary.' ").
40. See Rush v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub
nom. Rush v. Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978). When confronted with
medical procedures of doubtful medical necessity, most, if not all, state programs
make the assumption that the service is unnecessary and hence ordinarily do not pay
the costs of the procedure. At the same time, however, they provide that in exceptional
circumstances the procedure will be funded. For example, cosmetic surgery is usually
considered necessary to repair disfigurement caused by accidental injury. See, e.g.,
Code of Md. Reg., Health & Mental Hygiene 10.09.02.06(A)(1); Ore. Adm. Rules, Pub.
Welf. Reg. 461-13-010(5). To handle requests for sex conversion surgery in a similar
manner would be consistent with the realities of transsexualism. It is universally
agreed by experts on the subject that the only effective method of treating transsexual-
ism is sexchange surgery. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Yet, the operation
is certainly neither proper nor desirable for every individual who experiences gender
role disorientation. Sex conversion patients are carefully selected from the large num-
bers of candidates who apply to the few centers that provide it. For example, of the
approximately 250 inquiries each year made to the University Hospitals at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, only 12 to 20 operations are performed there annually. Sines Inter-
view, supra note 7. Most applicants are disapproved for psychological, mental, or social
reasons. Id. An evaluation team typically considers the transsexual's motive for having
the operation, whether the patient is psychotic (in which case surgery is not per-
formed), and to what extent the person will be able to adjust to life in the desired new
sexual role without experiencing insuperable problems with employment, living ar-
rangements, and social interaction. Knorr, Wolf & Meyer, supra note 33, at 275-79.
See generally Stoller, Male Transsexualism: Uneasiness, 130 AM. J. PsYcH. 536 (1973)
(more cautious evaluation by restrictive standards needed before recommendation of
surgery).
41. States may legitimately regulate to some extent the manner in which medical
services are provided "to protect the medical interests of the recipients." Doe v. Beal,
523 F.2d 611, 621 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). States
may impose specific medical requirements when "this would, in the particular in-
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stance, be consistent with sound medical practice. Gratuitous interference with medi-
cal decisions by doctors, on the other hand, would create a system of medical obstruc-
tion rather than of medical assistance." Id.
Since state and federal public welfare monies are not without limit, however, there
must necessarily be some restriction on the amount and scope of services that will be
funded. Therefore, states generally require that treatment be "medically necessary"
in order to be covered by Medicaid. Although authority for this restriction is not made
explicit in the text of title XIX, see Roe v. Norton, 522 F. 2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1975),
reu'd sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072,
1081 (D.N.H. 1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976), sections of the Medicaid statute
do refer indirectly to necessity as a limitation. See id. § 1396a(a)(30) (1976) (state plans
must "provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the
payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to
safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services"); id. §
1396a(a)(31) (state plans must include a program of "medical evaluation of each
patient's need for intermediate care"). See also Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 939 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The whole tenor
of Title XIX indicates the intent to place some limit on medical assistance.").
Furthermore, legislative history leaves little room for doubt that a medical neces-
sity restriction must be read into the Medicaid program. The legislative history of the
1965 amendments to the Social Security Act relates both to the revisions then being
made to the Medicare program, title XVIII, and to the newly created Medicaid pro-
gram, title XIX. Passages from the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, S.
REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1965), reprinted in [1965] 1 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1943 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 404], strongly support an implied
medical necessity limitation. See, e.g., id. at 1987 ("[T]he bill would require that a
physician certify that the services were required for an individual's medical treatment
...and that the services were necessary for such purpose."); id. at 1989 ("The bill
would bar payment for health items or services that are not reasonable and necessary
for the treatment of illness or injury.").
The regulations promulgated under title XIX also indicate that Medicaid contains
an implied "medical necessity" standard. The states are expressly authorized to place
limitations on the amount, scope, and duration of services based on reasonable criteria
such as medical necessity, to establish utilization control, and to review program
criteria promulgated pursuant to the mandate of title XIX, which criteria are also to
be based on necessity or medical necessity criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1976);
42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1978). The utilization control plans are to be set up by the states
as "safeguards against unnecessary or inappropriate utilization of care and services"
provided. Id. § 450.18(a). Federal regulations concerning utilization review of institu-
tional care require an independent committee to review the attending physician's
decision as to medical necessity for admission. Id. § 450.19(a)(1)(viii). Any lingering
doubt as to the implied authority to limit services based on medical necessity was
dispelled by the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) program. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -19 (1976) (enacted in 1972). This statutory scheme is designed
to assure that payments made under Medicare and Medicaid will be limited to those
that are medically necessary. Id. § 1320. It provides for a network of professional
medical organizations, (PSROs), which are authorized to monitor and control use of
funded services through physician-established norms to check individual services
for medical necessity, appropriateness, and quality. Id. §§ 1320c-4(a)(1), -5. When the
program is fully implemented, PSROs will act as final arbiters of medical necessity,
preempting the utilization controls and review procedures currently in force. See
generally Gosfield, Medical Necessity in Medicare and Medicaid: The Implications of
Professional Standards Review Organizations, 51 T!Ell. L.Q. 229 (1978).
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Yet, Congress has given some indication that cost-based limita-
tions on the extent of Medicaid coverage may be reasonable. As origi-
nally enacted in 1965 and as amended in 1969, title XIX required
states to make efforts to broaden the scope and extent of covered care
and services and to liberalize eligibility requirements with a view
toward furnishing comprehensive care and services by 1977.42 In light
of the drastic increase in health care costs and in the number of
eligible recipients during the ten-year period following enactment of
the Medicaid program, however, Congress found it necessary in 1972
to repeal this provision of the Social Security Act. 3 The net effect
was to permit states wider latitude in setting program limitations,
especially in the optional coverage categories. 4 It would, therefore,
not appear unreasonable for a state to devise limitations on services
based on excessive costs involved. 5 Although no such justification
42. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1903(e), 79 Stat.
286 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (1970)) (repealed 1972).
43. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 230, 86
Stat. 1410 (1972). At the same time, other mandatory and optional program cutbacks
were made. See id.
44. See id. Indeed, the report of the Ways and Means Committee relaxed the
pressure on the states to provide optional services, in order to assure a maintenance of
effort with regard to basic services. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1972),
reprinted in [1972] 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4989, 5086-87. It should be noted,
however, that the reductions and cutbacks were made specifically in view of the fiscal
difficulties being experienced by state programs, and did not represent evidence of
withdrawal of congressional intent to make the programs comprehensive as soon as
feasible. See id. at 5086.
An example of the states' response to the repeal of § 1396b(e) is illustrated in
Medical Soc'y v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1977). That opinion notes that New York,
motivated by fiscal necessity, "attempted to limit authorized surgery to that which is
urgently necessary or which, if delayed, might cause an increased medical risk, jeop-
ardize life or essential function,'or cause severe pain." Id. at 537. The court did not
pass on the validity of the state's assertion that this limitation was designed to safe-
guard against unnecessary use of medical care and services thereby ensuring that
medical payments were not in excess of reasonable charges consistent with quality of
care, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1976), and as such was an appropriate limit "based on
such criteria as medical necessity." 560 F.2d at 538-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. §
249.10(a)(5)(i) (earlier codification of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230).
Similarly, the court in Virginia Hospital Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781 (E.D.
Va. 1977), adjudicating the validity of Virginia's 21-day limitation on inpatient hospi-
tal coverage, held that states may, consistently with title XIX, limit the days of
coverage of inpatient hospital care, and that this limitation was a reasonable one. Id.
at 786. For a discussion of the validity of fiscally motivated limitations on Medicaid
funding, see Note, State Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of Medically Necessary
Services, 78 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1491 (1978).
45. See Lawrence v. Maher, [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH)
24,565 (D. Conn., Mar. 21, 1977) (state may limit periodontal services while allowing
other services, because the limitation was based on cost and thus was reasonable). See
Note, supra note 44, at 1503-10.
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was proffered by the state in Doe, if the state had justified the abso-
lute exclusion of transsexual surgery on the basis of excessive cost,
then it might have been less obvious that the court should overturn
the exclusion.
Nevertheless, had the state made such an argument, the proper
course would been to have reject it. The cost of a treatment plan
culminating in transsexual surgery ranges from $7,500 to $10,000.6 In
Minnesota, fewer than twenty such procedures are performed each
year.4" Even if all such transsexual patients were eligible to receive
Medicaid funding, which is certainly not the case,48 the state could
not save enough by an absolute refusal to pay for transsexual surgery
to justify overriding the federally-mandated policy of providing nec-
essary medical care to indigents.
An even better approach would have been for the court to hold
that title XIX requires states to fund all "medically necessary""
procedures falling within the categories of care a participating state
must provide to eligible recipients. Such a holding would dispose of
all cost-based exclusions which purport to economize at the expense
of those who are both financially and medically in need.
Support for this desirable but unarticulated alternative holding
may be drawn from two recent federal court opinions that have inter-
preted the meaning of the medical necessity standard implicit in the
Medicaid program. In Beal v. Doe,"0 the United States Supreme
Court held that states are free to refuse coverage for care and services
that are determined, by standards reasonable and consistent with
title XIX, to be medically unnecessary.5' At the same time, however,
46. The cost is approximately $7,500 for biological males and $10,000 for biologi-
cal females. These are the current figures at the University of Minnesota Hospitals,
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Sines Interview, supra note 7.
47. Id.
48. According to Dr. Sines, in the past three years, only one transsexual who
applied for treatment at the University Hospitals and who met all of the qualifications
for surgery could not afford to pay. Id.
49. See note 57 infra.
50. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
51. Id. at 444-45. In Beal, the issue for decision was whether title XIX requires
states participating in Medicaid to fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions. The
Pennsylvania Medicaid program would only pay for those abortions certified by physi-
cians as medically necessary according to program guidelines. The Court determined
that the Pennsylvania definition of medical necessity was broad enough to encompass
the factors found in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973), to be constitutionally
relevant to the physician's judgment as to whether an abortion is necessary for a
woman's health and well-being. 432 U.S. at 441 n.3. Noting that title XIX gives the
states broad discretion in adopting standards for limiting the extent of medical assis-
tance, requiring only that the standards be reasonable and consistent with the objec-
tives of the Act, the Court held Pennsylvania's regulation to be consistent with title
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the Court intimated that states are required to fund all necessary
medical treatment within the categories of mandatory Medicaid cov-
erage. 2 Subsequent to these pronouncements, a Georgia federal court
in Rush v. Parham5 3 interpreted Beal as holding that "[b]enefits for
medically necessary services. . . are the irreducible minimum cover-
age which states must provide."5 The Rush court, however, went
further, concluding that judgments of medical necessity are to be
made for individual patients by their attending physicians.55 Noting
XIX and not unreasonable. The state, it said, has a valid and important interest in
encouraging childbirth; title XIX does not make efforts to protect this interest un-
reasonable. Thus, the Court declined to assume that Congress intended to require
funding of non-therapeutic abortions as a condition to a state's receipt of federal
Medicaid money, absent evidence of such intent in the statute or legislative history.
432 U.S. at 446. Since Pennsylvania's plan did allow for funding of necessary abor-
tions, the Court was not called upon to decide whether title XIX mandates coverage
of all necessary procedures within the five minimum areas of coverage. But see note
52 infra and accompanying text.
52. See 432 U.S. at 444-45 ("Although serious statutory questions might be pre-
sented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its cover-
age, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund
unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical services.") (emphasis in original).
53. 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom. Rush v. Poythress,
No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978). See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
54. 440 F. Supp. 383, 389. Georgia was ordered to pay the cost of petitioner's
transsexual surgery which was diagnosed as "urgently indicated" by the attending
physicians. Id. at 386. But see Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126 (1st. Cir.
1979); Note, supra note 44, at 1498-1502.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals came to the contrary conclusion that Medicaid
does not mandate coverage for all medically necessary services. See 591 F.2d at 126.
The court, noting the absense of a direct statutory order to fund all necessary services,
was reluctant to read the broad "necessary medical services" language in the preamble
to title XIX as an affirmative requirement for state Medicaid plans. Nonetheless, the
court reached an essentially identical result by applying the "reasonable standards
• ..for determining. . . the extent of medical assistance under the plan which...
are consistent with the objectives of Title XIX." See notes 23, 38-41 supra and accom-
panying text. In any event, the eventual implementation of the PSRO system for
determining medical necessity, see note 41 supra, would tend to delimit the implica-
tions of the First Circuit view, since upon a finding of necessity by the PSRO the state
will be required to make payment for the prescribed care. See Gosfield, supra note 41,
at 238.
55. 440 F. Supp. at 390. This holding is strongly, albeit indirectly, supported by
the congressional history of the Professional Standards Review Organization system.
See note 41 supra. This congressional history reveals that Congress was troubled by
the prevalent practice of allowing clerical personnel in the employ of insurance compa-
nies and government to make decisions regularly as to the necessity of medical care
for which payment under Medicaid was requested. Congress therefore wanted to estab-
lish a bridge between medicine and government that would both ensure the funding
of necessary care and prevent improper utilization and over-utilization of services. The
PSRO program was seen as eliminating the isolation existing between the medical
professionals responsible for prescribing and providing necessary medical services and
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that what is unnecessary for one individual could well be essential for
another, the court said a state may not categorically deny coverage
for any service or procedure. 6
Unfortunately, there is no generally acknowledged definition of
medical necessity.57 It is instead a policy limitation designed to serve
the government that pays for such services. The bridge was built of medical profession-
als, sensibly recognizing their primacy in the medical necessity decision. See S. REP.
No. 1230, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1972); note 75 infra.
56. 440 F. Supp. at 390. In dictum, the court noted that "[tihe state may choose
to list presumptively covered or uncovered medical services. However, clear guidance
on the availability and procedure for rebutting the presumptions of the list must also
be provided." Id. at 391 n.16.
57. There are many possible ways to define medical necessity. One writer has
suggested that a useful definition would be that prevailing in the medical community:
"the care which is responsive to the problem for which it is offered." Butler, The
Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 955 (1977). The
physician first identifies the condition and prescribes treatment. If that treatment
is "safe and efficacious for that condition," it is medically necessary. Id. Though
such a standard would seem to allow funding for such arguably unnecessary pro-
cedures as cosmetic surgery, the states would be free to exercise their broad dis-
cretionary power to exclude such procedures based on other reasonable grounds,
such as economy and prevention of unnecessary use of program resources. See
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1976). See also Doe
v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1975) rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). See generally
Butler, supra, at 954-61; Note, supra note 44. Most state plans do not even define
"medical necessity." Nonetheless, states generally use the term to signify some
purpose such as restoration or maintenance of health by correction of some defect,
cure or prevention of illness, or removal of disability. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 14059 (West 1972); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 365-a(2) (McKinney 1976). The
Maryland plan describes medically necessary physicians' services as those
"[cilearly related to the recipient's individual medical needs as diagnostic,
curative, palliative, or rehabilitative services." Code of Md. Reg., Health & Mental
Hygiene 10.09.02.04(B) (2). Idaho reimburses recipients for "necessary hospitalization"
for "treatment of medical or surgical conditions of any nature which are a threat to
the life or health of the patient." Idaho Health & Welfare Reg. 3-1410.01. New Mexico
refuses coverage "considered not medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment
of illness or injury or not required by the condition of the recipient." NEW MEXICO
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BUREAU, DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
MANUAL § 303-B(2) (1978). Oregon refuses to pay for those items or services not
"reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed body member or for correction of an organic
system." Ore. Pub. Welf. Reg. 461-13-010 (1974). The somewhat unusual Michigan
approach has as its primary objective ensuring the provision of "essential health care
services" found to be medically necessary by the attending physician, meanwhile
recognizing that "there occasionally may be recipients for whom this same principle
of medical necessity indicates a need for services beyond those ordinarily covered." In
those cases, the patient may apply through his physician for an independent determi-
nation of funding. MICHIGAN DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Covered Medical Services, in
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY MANUAL (1978) (statement of departmental policy).
Under the PSRO system, see note 41 supra, payment cannot be made for any service
not medically necessary, and in the absence of controlling federal statutory definitions
of the terms "necessity," "therapeutic," or "elective," the PSRO bases its determine-
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broad programmatic functions. Limited public funds must be chan-
nelled to the most urgent uses. Only if additional funds remain
should they be expended on less "necessary" treatments. For this
reason, the amount of money a state has available for its Medicaid
program, to a certain extent, determines the stringency of the medi-
cal necessity standard to be applied.8 This is one area in which states
must exercise their broad discretion. As long as the standards applied
are "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives of Medicaid,"
states should be free to employ such guidelines as they see fit.5' That
does not mean, however, that a state could select a single medical
procedure-such as transsexual surgery-as the sole means to imple-
ment its cost reduction program."
Perhaps recognizing the fatal weakness of its absolute prohibi-
tion on sex conversion surgery, 6' and unable to justify its actions on
tions on norms, criteria, and standards representing an aggregate of physicians' medi-
cal judgments in the particular region. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-4, -5 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
See Gosfield, supra note 41, at 241-43, 277-78.
58. The preamble to the Medicaid statute itself acknowledges that there are
inherent limitations on each state's fiscal ability to furnish medical care to indigents.
See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra. Yet, no state should be permitted to place
purely arbitrary limits on coverage under the guise of medical necessity. At the least,
when reasonable medical minds could not differ as to the necessity of a given proce-
dure, the state is required to fund it. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977); Rush
v. Parham, 440 F. Supp. 383, 389 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom. Rush v.
Poythress, No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has
said that for a state to apply a definition of medical necessity that allows funding only
when the patient would die without treatment would violate federal regulations and
also be inconsistent with the objectives of Medicaid. See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591
F.2d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 1979).
59. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
61. On appeal, the state abandoned any argument in support of the absolute
exclusion, and was unwilling even to acknowledge that there was such a restriction.
Instead, it merely averred that "the district court decision in this case in no way
forecloses appellant from meeting the required showing of medical necessity at some
later date." Brief for Respondent at 11, Doe v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977). The facts, however, clearly reflect the absolute exclusion.
The Physicians' Handbook listed transsexual surgery as a noncovered service. See note
32 supra. This provision explicitly formed one basis of the state agency's denial of
funding for Doe's surgery. 257 N.W.2d at 818. Furthermore, at the time the case was
argued, the state agency had proposed a new rule governing the Medical Assistance
program that listed transsexual surgery as excluded. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7.
Subsequently, Department of Public Welfare Rule 47 was implemented with a revision
to reflect the decision in Doe. It now requires prior authorization for funding of trans-
sexual surgery. See 12 Minn. Code of Agency Rules § 2.047(E)(1)(k), as amended by
Letter from Edward J. Dirkswager, Jr., Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Public Welfare, to the Directors of County Welfare Departments (Sept. 13, 1977)
(amending Rule 47).
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fiscal grounds, the state agency also adopted an alternative theory
upon which to deny Ms. Doe her surgical metamorphosis. Exercising
its "broad discretion" under title XIX, it asserted that for an appli-
cant to qualify for Medical Assistance funding for a surgical treat-
ment, she must present conclusive evidence that it will not only
remove her disability but also render her self-supporting.2
The state made no effort to rebut the obvious inference that this
standard had been specially contrived to deny Doe funding. 3 A read-
ing of the record suggests that its origin, ironically, was in the aspira-
tions Ms. Doe voiced at her hearing. The hearing examiner found that
"[s]urgery is imperative to alleviate the physical and medical prob-
lems caused by the hormonal treatments. [Doe] must live a secret
life. She is hoping that after the surgery she would be able to be self-
supporting and independent of welfare." 4 On appeal, the state
agency reversed the hearing examiner's approval of funding because
"[n]o conclusive evidence was presented to support the petitioner's
contention that, if she has the surgery, her psychological problems
will be alleviated to the point that she will no longer be disabled and
will become self-supporting."" By the time the district court passed
on the case, Ms. Doe's "contention" had become "the required stan-
dard of medical necessity" she failed to satisfy.
Fortunately, the supreme court refused to lend its support to
such a standard. The court illustrated the absurdity of the agency's
position by noting its effect on more conventional medical treatment:
A cancer patient would be unable to prove by conclusive evidence
that removal of her tumor would eradicate her disease. 7 Moreover, a
requirement that the treatment be able to remove the applicant from
the welfare rolls would be "ludicrous," since it would entail denying
a terminally ill patient amelioration of her agony merely because she
lacked any prospect of becoming self-supporting as a result of the
treatment.
62. 257 N.W.2d at 818.
63. Doe alleged that this draconian burden of proof had not previously been
imposed on any applicant. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 48, 52. The state's
only refutation of this assertion was that the medical assistance program "has always
been administered in compliance with state and federal laws." Brief for Respondent,
supra note 61, at 11 n.5. Doe was never informed that this new "standard" would be
applied in her case. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 49.
64. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-1 (finding of Fact No. 7 by Local
Evidentiary Hearing Officer). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
65. Id. at A-8 (Order of the Commissioner of Public Welfare denying funding (1-
21-76)). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at A-17 (conclusion of law by Hennepin
County Dist. Ct.).
67. 257 N.W.2d at 821.
68. Id.
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Though the court's reasoning possesses common sense appeal,
useful resort could have been had to the language of title XIX itself.
Any standard for determining eligibility for and extent of medical
assistance must be reasonable and consistent with Medicaid's objec-
tives. 9 Judged by the consequences of its operation, this agency stan-
dard, like the absolute exclusion from coverage, clearly failed the
most minimal test of reasonableness; nor could any state plan com-
port with title XIX's general objective of furnishing medical assis-
tance to individuals who cannot afford the costs of necessary medical
services if it effectively bars many eligible individuals from receiving
the very assistance the Medicaid program was designed to provide.
When the Minnesota court invalidated the absolute exclusion of
transsexual surgery funding in the Medical Assistance program, it
also decreed a procedure for determining necessity in future cases.
Henceforth, there must be a case-by-case, "thorough, complete, and
unbiased medical evaluation" performed by the individual agencies. 7 ,
This requirement, the court said, was consistent with the Medicaid
statute and a "practical, equitable solution to the rather unique and
complicated problem posed by transsexualism."'
This analysis is undoubtedly correct. Such a procedure comports
with the title XIX mandate that the states safeguard against unnec-
essary use of program funds,7 2 yet assures that care and services will
be provided in a manner consistent with the best interests of the
individual recipient. 73 Moreover, it complies with federal regulations
by basing the decision to fund on a medical determination of neces-
sity rather than on diagnosis, type of illness, or condition. 7 To place
with the medical community the responsibility to decide whether a
given patient needs a certain treatment is consistent with Congress'
discernible intent" to leave the matter to the judgment and discretion
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
70. 257 N.W.2d at 820. For the state agency's implementation of the Doe proce-
dure, see note 61 supra. The same approach should govern arguably similar procedures
such as bypass surgery to correct obesity, mammary implants following mastectomy,
orthodontia, cosmetic surgery, and contact lenses. Medical necessity in cases of this
kind depends on individualized evaluation of the medical, psychological, and other
circumstances of the particular case. This procedure parallels the PSRO system, see
notes 41 & 57 supra, in methodology and function.
71. 257 N.W.2d at 820.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1976).
73. See id. § 1396a(a)(19).
74. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1978).
75. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 404, supra note 41, at [1965] 1 U.S. CODE: CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1986 ("[T]he physician is to be the key figure in determining utilization of
health services . . .[and] it is a physician who is to decide upon admission to a
hospital, order tests, drugs and treatments, and determine the length of stay. ...
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of the examining physicians who are best acquainted with their trans-
sexual patients' condition and history. 6
The result in Doe v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare
parallels the handful of other cases that have addressed the issue of
whether Medicaid programs must fund sex conversion surgery for
transsexuals. In two recent California cases,77 transsexual plaintiffs
offered the opinions of a number of medical experts78 that theit sur-
gery requests were necessary and reasonable. Relying on the opinion
of an ophthalmological medical consultant and without performing
an independent medical examination or introducing other evidence,
the California Medical Assistance Director refused their applications,
asserting that the operations were "cosmetic," since they would
change the appearance of the external genitals."0 The court, noting
that "[m]ale genitals would have to be considered more than just
skin," found it "clearly impossible to conclude that transsexual sur-
gery is cosmetic surgery."'" Therefore, it reversed the director's deci-
sion as arbitrary, and ordered funding. 2
[T]he bill would require that payment could only be made if a physician certifies to
the medical necessity of the services furnished.!'). For a discussion of whether Con-
gress intended the definition of medical necessity to fall within state discretion, see
Butler, supra note 57, at 954-55 n.146 (1977).
76. Such an allocation of decision making is eminently sensible in the case of
transsexualism. Gender-role dysphoria is a highly complex disorder that is not wholly
understood even by those most expert in the field. The transsexual's desire to become
a member of the opposite sex begins in the first few years of life and never abates. See
R. STOLLER, supra note 33, at 147. All attempts to change such false gender orientation
have failed. See note 33 supra. Surgery has been quite successful in relieving the
transsexual's suffering and in improving social adjustment, but the decision whether
to recommend the sex conversion operation can only be made after extensive testing
and study. See note 40 supra. The state agency's flat prohibition against coverage and
bare assertion that surgery is not medically necessary for transsexuals is therefore well
replaced by the court's individualized medical determination of necessity.
77. See J.D. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 90, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1978); G.B. v.
Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978).
78. The experts included specialists in plastic surgery, psychiatry, internal medi-
cine, and psychology. Among them were the codirector of and a consultant to the
Stanford University Gender Dysphoria Program, and a doctor from the Gender Iden-
tity Clinic at the Johns Hopkins Medical Institute. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 557; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
79. G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 68, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556-57 (1978);
J.D. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 90, 93-94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 571 (1978).
80. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 572; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 67, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 556. California's medical assistance program defined cosmetic surgery as
"[s]urgery to alter the texture or configuration of the skin and its relationship with
contiguous structures of any feature of the human body." 80 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 558.
81. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 70-71, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
82. Id. at 71, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 559; 80 Cal. App. 3d at 95, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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In Rush v. Parham,8' a Georgia federal court also concluded that
transsexual surgery may be medically necessary for purposes of a
state Medicaid plan. The applicant in that case had been diagnosed
by at least two physicians as a true transsexual for whom surgery was
"urgently indicated" to "alleviate her depression and remove the
threat of suicide."" The court struck down Georgia's absolute exclu-
sion against funding of sex conversion surgery as violative of title XIX
and its regulations." The court also rejected the state's assertion that
in any event the surgery was unnecessary, holding that judgments of
medical necessity must be made on an individual basis, without state
interference, between patient and physician.
In Denise R. v. Lavine,17 the New York Appellate Division re-
viewed a denial of funding for surgery for a transsexual who had
presented psychiatric evidence of "severe psychopathology." The
Department of Social Services made no independent medical exami-
nation, and no other evidence was presented at the hearing. The court
held that the department's denial of funding in such circumstances,
which was purported to be predicated on a "medical basis" but which
actually lacked any supportive evidence or explanation, was arbitrary
and capricious.m In vacating that decision and upholding denial of
funding, the New York Court of Appeals by a 4-3 vote found that the
director was entitled within his discretion to rely on one of two argua-
bly conflicting medical opinions offered by the applicant's physician,
one of which could be interpreted as indicating that the patient was
not indeed qualified for funding, having no formal disturbance in
thinking. 9 Although it would have been desirable for the agency to
have conducted a separate examination or to have adduced its own
evidence against necessity, the agency's failure to do so did not
render the adverse decision arbitrary as a matter of law. 9
83. 440 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal filed sub nom. Rush v. Poythress,
No. 77-2743 (5th Cir. Apr. 1978).
84. Id. at 386 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 390-91. The Rush Court, like the Minnesota court in Doe, relied on the
federal regulation prohibiting arbitrary denials of or reductions in coverage based
solely on diagnosis, type of illness, or condition. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (1978).
86. 440 F. Supp. at 389-90.
87. 47 App. Div. 2d 747, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 557 (1975) (mem.), rev'd, 39 N.Y.2d 279,
347 N.E.2d 893, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1976).
88. Id. at 559.
89. 39 N.Y.2d. 279, 281, 347 N.E.2d 893, 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568, 569.
90. Id. at 282, 347 N.E.2d at 895, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 570. The three dissenting
judges agreed with the appellate division that the sex change operation fell clearly
within the colerage of the New York Medicaid statute and was medically indicated
for the petitioner. They pointed out that the isolated analysis of the patient, an analy-
sis that revealed no formal disturbance in thinking, did not when read in context with
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It is heartening that the Minnesota court rejected this New York
decision as having any effect on its determination in Doe, although
at the time it was the only appellate decision addressing the issue of
transsexual funding, except for the opinion it overruled. It is a credit
to the Minnesota court that, when confronted with the sensitive,
perhaps politically volatile issue of sex conversion surgery for trans-
sexuals, it chose a route of principled decision making to reach an
obviously just and justified result, rather than choosing the path of
least resistance by upholding the administrative decision as within
discretion. Perhaps the true test of the merit of the court's holding,
however, is revealed in the fact that the decision has, in its short
life, already been cited several times as authoritative by courts and
commentators free to reject its approach for another.9 '
the rest of the doctor's report, justify refusing payment for the surgery. In his report,
the doctor ultimately concluded that the patient was suffering from severe psychopath-
ology, and recommended referral for surgery at an appropriate institution. 39 N.Y.2d
279, 283-84, 347 N.E.2d 893, 895-96, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570-71.
91. G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 77-81, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 562-64, 80 Cal.
App.3d 64, 69, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (1978) (analyzed and distinguished in dissenting
opinion by Justice Scott); Pinneke v. Preisser, 47 U.S.L.W. 2790 (N.D. Iowa May 11,
1979).
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